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Moral Judgment, Criminal Law and
the Constitutional Protection of
Religion
Benjamin L. Berger

I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the most elemental aspects of modern criminal justice have
their foundation in the relationship between law and religion. The jury, a
central component of our imaginary — even if not so prevalent in our
lived reality — of criminal justice in Canada, arose when, at the Fourth
Lateran Council in 1215, the Pope forbade clergy from participating in
the ordeals.1 Ordeals were necessary because it was inconceivable for one
man to stand in mortal judgment (and in this period in the development
of the Western legal tradition, most criminal judgment was a mortal
matter) of another. Only God had the authority to pass such judgment
and the ordeals were the means of discerning God’s will. Without the
clergy the ordeals were impossible and without the ordeals there appeared
to be no means of administering criminal justice. A new form of ordeal, the
jury trial, filled the gap thus created in the administration of criminal justice.
We carry forward, largely unacknowledged, this religious foundation in
the systemic design of the modern Canadian criminal trial.
This deep religious influence touches our core substantive commitments
in criminal justice as well. James Whitman has recently shown that the
origins of the “reasonable doubt” standard can be traced to a theological
concern for protecting the souls of the jurors.2 To sit in judgment of and
convict another individual was always a potential mortal sin; to allay jurors’
fears — and, hence, to encourage conviction — they were reassured

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. E-mail: bberger@uvic.ca. I am
grateful to Jamie Cameron, Natasha Bakht and Robert Leckey for their comments on earlier
versions of this article and to Alison Latimer for her invaluable research assistance.
1
Benjamin L. Berger, “Criminal Appeals as Jury Control: An Anglo-Canadian Historical
Perspective on the Rise of Criminal Appeals” (2005) 10:1 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 1.
2
James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal
Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
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that, as long as they held no reasonable doubt, their souls would be safe.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt — originally a device of theological
and moral comfort — has not only been constitutionalized through section
11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 but has been
described as the “silver thread” that runs alongside the golden thread of
the presumption of innocence, “forever intertwined in the fabric of
criminal law”.4 Again, only fleetingly glimpsed and sparingly discussed,
the interaction of criminal law and religion continues to strongly inform
our modern conception of criminal justice.
The introduction of the Charter in 1982 brought about a revolution
in the procedural, evidentiary and substantive components of criminal
justice in Canada. Indeed, the textual heart of the Charter is concerned
with legal rights surrounding the criminal process and a good deal of ink
has flown from some very fine pens revealing and analyzing the ways in
which the Charter has fundamentally affected the administration of
criminal justice in Canada.5 The story of the Charter’s impact on the rich
historical relationship between law and religion has not yet, however,
been told. In some ways, given the examples that I have cited, this is not
surprising. The jury trial and the demand for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt have unmoored from their religious bases and the question, though
interesting as an historical matter, may seem of little contemporary
moment. There is, however, a way in which this absence of reflection on
the post-Charter interaction of criminal law and the constitutional status
of religion is conspicuous and, with certain questions of substantive
criminal law and religion appearing on the horizon, increasingly so.
The hidden but abiding tension that I am positing between substantive
criminal law and religious freedom and equality is really rather neat and
can be sharply put. When one takes a conceptual step back, one sees that
the constitutional protection of religious freedom and substantive criminal
law are both centrally concerned with the role of the state in making and
enforcing moral judgments, but are contesting this boundary from opposite
directions. On the one hand, the constitutional protection of religious
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11, [hereinafter “the Charter”].
4
R. v. Lifchus, [1997] S.C.J. No. 77, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, at para. 27 (S.C.C.).
5
See, e.g., Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough,
ON: Thomson Carswell, 2005); Kent Roach, “Twenty Years of the Charter and Criminal Justice:
A Dialogue Between a Charter Optimist, a Charter Realist, and a Charter Sceptic” (2003) 19 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 39; James Stribopoulos, “Has Everything Been Decided? Certainty, the Charter and Criminal
Justice” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 381; Alan Brudner, “Guilt under the Charter: The Lure of
Parliamentary Supremacy” (1998) 40:3-4 Crim. L.Q. 287.
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freedom and equality, a now-orthodox component of any modern
constitutional democracy, is, at core, the quintessential reflection of the
modern liberal demand that the state remain withdrawn from the domain
of moral judgments and claims about the good life. At its most obvious
level, this constraint precludes the state from imposing a particular religious
view. More foundationally, however, section 2(a) of the Charter reflects
the notion that beliefs and actions linked to judgments that flow from
one’s sense of the order of things should be left untouched by government.
The inclusion of religion as a listed prohibited ground for state-imposed
inequality underscores this commitment and reflects the historical tendency
for state power to forget this admonition to the detriment of its religious
citizens. On the other hand, the substantive criminal law is precisely a
domain of moral judgment. It is a field not only concerned with notions
of individual moral blame, but one whose very conceptual foundation is
that society can judge certain actions to be so morally repugnant as to
warrant state actions with fearsome consequences for the individual. As
frankly conceded in the list of permissible ends of the federal criminal
law power,6 and despite certain contemporary arguments about the moral
neutrality of modern criminal law to the contrary, whatever else the
criminal law is doing — and it is always doing many things — it is a
domain of law that uses the power of the state to enforce basic societal
claims about morality. At this level of analysis, the constitutional
protection of religious conscience and the substantive criminal law have
been on a conceptual collision course.
The post-Charter silence surrounding these dimensions of our public
law commitments is, from this perspective, somewhat remarkable. This
is particularly so given the pre-Charter history of Anglo-Canadian
criminal law, which includes the famous Hart-Devlin debate7 and cases

6
The criminal law’s power to enforce basic societal claims about morality was affirmed
post-Charter in R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 77 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”]. Justices Gonthier and Binnie for the majority state:
The protection of vulnerable groups from self-inflicted harms does not, as Caine argues,
amount to no more than “legal moralism”. Morality has traditionally been identified as a
legitimate concern of the criminal law (Labatt Breweries, supra, at p. 933) although today
this does not include mere ‘conventional standards of propriety’ but must be understood as
referring to societal values beyond the simply prurient or prudish. …
7
See Patrick Devlin, “Morals and the Criminal Law” in The Enforcement of Morals
(London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), at 1; Patrick Devlin, “Morals and
Contemporary Social Reality” in ibid., at 124; H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:
Oxford University Press, 1966); H.L.A. Hart, “Immorality and Treason” in Richard A. Wasserstrom,
ed., Morality and the Law (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971), at 48. The Hart-Devlin
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like Switzman v. Elbling8 and Roncarelli v. Duplessis9 that put the use of
the penal law as an instrument of moral coercion at the centre of our
constitutional consciousness. This paper is intended to begin to tell the
story of this relationship between the constitutional protection of religion
and the substantive criminal law, to offer some explanations for the relative
silence surrounding the interaction of these two fields of law, and to
demonstrate the way in which — and why — the issue is now re-emerging
so powerfully.
The first step in uncovering this story is to expose a line of Charter
authority that, whether by invalidating, condoning or otherwise influencing
substantive criminal law, has been concerned with the freedom and equality
of religion. This is an important part of our criminal and constitutional
legacy and will be addressed in Part II. Yet, at the same time, substantive
criminal law under the Charter has weathered an attempt to dull the
sharpness of the criminal law’s claims to the enforcement of a vision of
the “good”. This trend has suppressed the potential tension between the
criminal law and the constitutional protection of conscientious difference
but, as Part III will demonstrate, fissures are opening up and the conceptual
friction that I have described is starting to give off heat. I will conclude
with some reflections on how to manage conflicts between the immutably
normative dimensions of substantive criminal law and our collective
commitment to the constitutional protection of religious conscience.

II. RELIGION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN THE CHARTER ERA
When inquiring into the interaction of an aspect of the Charter and
an area of substantive law, there is an understandable tendency to engage
a kind of flawed synecdoche. The analysis can readily and myopically
turn exclusively to the constitutional provision in issue and, even more

debate was, of course, influential in the decriminalization of homosexual conduct between consenting
adults in 1969.
8
[1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Switzman”].
9
[1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Roncarelli”]. Although
neither Switzman nor Roncarelli was a criminal or quasi-criminal case, both arose out of situations
in which governments attempted to use the force of the penal law for deeply normative ends. Given
that both were decided in a pre-Charter era, the protection of conscience in Switzman and religion
in Roncarelli were cast in terms of division of powers and the limits of executive conduct under the
rule of law, respectively. Given the factual matrix out of which they arise — the prohibition of
expression of communist ideas and the imprisonment of Jehovah’s Witnesses for distributing
literature — the constitutional significance of both cases is strongly gilded by the broader question of
the use of penal law to enforce moral views.
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narrowly, to those instances in which a substantive law was challenged
as contravening the specific provision in question. The provision itself
thereby comes to stand as an emblem for the whole of the “constitutional”
impact of a given rights protection. In this way, interested in whether
associational rights have affected the criminal law, we look only to those
cases in which a claim was made that a criminal law breached section 2(d);
or, interested in the impact of the Charter protection of equality on the
criminal law, we search for those criminal provisions that have been the
subject of a section 15(1) analysis. The presence of a Charter protection
has, however, far broader impact on substantive law than this narrow
focus on the direct application of a constitutional right would suggest.10
This is certainly true of the influence of section 2(a) or religious
equality on substantive criminal law. To be sure, those cases in which a
criminal law is ruled constitutionally valid or invalid on the basis of
section 2(a) are important instances to consider when assessing the
influence of the constitutional protection of religious conscience on the
criminal law. Indeed, it was through this kind of application in the criminal
law arena that section 2(a) received its first and still most influential
elucidation. But to begin to tell the story of religious freedoms and
criminal law calls for a more expansive gaze. In addition to those cases
in which the criminal law has been viewed as a threat to religion, there
are important ways in which the substantive criminal law has been used
as facilitative or protective of religious freedom and equality. In these
instances, aspects of the criminal law have derived principled support
from the existence of the constitutional protections of religion, even if
the Charter was not directly applied. Finally, there are certain instances
in which the constitutional presence of religious freedom and equality
has been used as a resource in the interpretation of criminal laws that have
only occasional or incidental impact on religious freedom and equality.
These three categories differ in terms of the means and directness of
legal impact, but all are united in disclosing a conceptually intimate
relationship between substantive criminal law and the constitutional
protection of religious conscience.

10
For the kind of expansive reading of the influence of a constitutional right’s impact on
the criminal law for which I am advocating, in this case Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
s. 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11, see Christine Boyle, “The Role of Equality in Criminal Law” (1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev. 203.
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1. Criminal Law and Substantive Constitutionality
Turning first to those instances in which the substance of criminal or
quasi-criminal law has been tested against the protection of religious
freedom and equality, one is immediately met with the jurisprudential
Goliath that still stands at the gateway of not only religious freedoms but
the modern approach to the interpretation and application of the Charter,
more generally. Given that it established the purposive approach to
interpreting the Charter, declared the Charter’s sensitivity to both purpose
and effect, articulated the doctrine of shifting purpose, and laid the soil
from which the law of section 2(a) would grow, it is easy to forget that
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. 11 is part of the corpus of post-Charter
criminal and quasi-criminal jurisprudence. Chief Justice Dickson broke
from the precedent established in R. v. Robertson,12 by holding that the
use of penal legislation to enforce a Christian conception of the Sabbath
was inconsistent with the core value pursued by section 2(a) of the Charter:
“the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the
right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice
or by teaching and dissemination”.13 Chief Justice Dickson explained
that this kind of freedom entails the absence of both constraint and
coercion, with coercion including not only “such blatant forms of
compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of
sanction” but also “indirect forms of control which determine or limit
alternative courses of conduct available to others”. 14 The summary
conviction offence at issue in Big M offended the goods protected by
section 2(a) by “bind[ing] all to a sectarian Christian ideal”, thereby
working “a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter and the
dignity of all non-Christians”.15 Given its objectionable purpose, the law
could not be saved by section 1.
Big M is, thus, an instance of section 2(a) being used to invalidate
penal legislation in the name of protecting religious freedom. Although
Big M would have foundational impact on the interpretation of the
Charter as a whole, as well as on the concept of religious freedom
embodied in section 2(a), it is worth noting the particular manner in
11
12
13
14
15

[1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Big M”].
[1963] S.C.J. No. 62, [1963] S.C.R. 651 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336-37 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.).
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which Dickson C.J.C.’s analysis in the case was influenced by and, as such,
spoke directly and meaningfully to the very nature of criminal law. First,
Dickson C.J.C. spoke specifically of the evil of this legislation being the
attempt to use “the force of the state” to bind all individuals to “values
rooted in Christian morality”.16 This objection to the conjunction of
particular moral claims and “the force of the state” — with a specifically
articulated concern for “direct commands to act or refrain from acting
on pain of sanction”17 — is an objection that drives to the core of the
criminal law, the most coercive means at the disposal of the state for
enforcing a normative conception of social conduct. In this way, the
very casting of the issue in Big M invites the question of the relationship
between religious freedom and criminal law outlined in the introduction to
this paper. Yet there is a degree of ambivalence in the judgment disclosed
by the second way in which Big M spoke interestingly and directly to
the criminal law. Chief Justice Dickson articulated a principled limit on
the scope of religious freedom, stating that the freedom contemplated in
section 2(a) was “subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others”.18 The reference to the parallel rights and freedoms
of others portends the conflict of rights jurisprudence that would become
the signal feature of religious liberties jurisprudence;19 but it is the first
half of the sentence that is of most interest for present purposes. This list
of interests mirrors the list of permissible bases for the use of the
federal criminal law power: “public peace, order, security, health and
morality”.20 These matters — public safety, order, health and morals —
are both the limits of religious freedom and the permissible uses of the
criminal law power. Although unelaborated by the Court, there is here a
seed of recognition that the nature of the criminal law is tightly imbricated
with religious freedom. On the one hand, given its intrinsic permeability to
morality and inherently coercive form, criminal law poses the quintessential
threat to the freedoms guaranteed in section 2(a). On the other hand, the
freedoms guaranteed in section 2(a) will be subject to limitation on bases
16

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.).
18
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.).
19
See, e.g., Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001]
S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Trinity Western”]; Chamberlain v. Surrey
School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 (S.C.C.).
20
Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada, [1979] S.C.J. No. 134, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, at 933 (S.C.C.).
See also R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 77 (S.C.C.).
17
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identical to the legitimate ends of criminal law. The Court’s subsequent
ruling upholding Sunday closing laws as justified infringements on section
2(a) confirmed that the boundary between criminal legislation and religious
freedom would be a fraught one, largely contested within the terms of
section 1.21
Cases exploring the constitutionality of criminal and quasi-criminal
legislation in light of religious freedoms and equality can be found at all
levels of Canadian courts. Certain cases have addressed the constitutionality
of truancy laws in light of religious freedoms,22 an issue that evocatively
recalls the dark pre-Charter history of the use of the criminal law against
the Doukhobours of the B.C. interior.23 Other cases have addressed freedom
of religion as it applies to the quasi-criminal regulation of hunting and
Aboriginal spiritual life.24 The identification doctrine found in the realm
of corporate criminal liability has even been challenged as contrary to
section 2(a) when used to incriminate a religious organization.25 Allow
me to draw out in somewhat greater detail two examples of the courts
dealing with claims that criminal or quasi-criminal laws are invalid as
offensive to religious freedom.
The first, R. v. S. (M.),26 is interesting both in that it, like Big M,27
involves an argument about freedom from religion and also because the
Court makes particularly overt claims about the interaction among criminal
law, religious freedom, and moral judgment. In R. v. S. (M.), the accused
challenged the constitutionality of section 155 of the Criminal Code,28
the incest provision. Among his various grounds was the argument that
the rule against incest is a religiously based prohibition arising from
Jewish and Christian principles that he did not share and that, as such, it
constituted religious coercion through the criminal law. Justice Donald’s
rejection of this argument, though unceremonious, powerfully expressed
a view of the legitimate ambit of the criminal law, a scope that necessarily

21

R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.).
See, e.g., R. v. Jones, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 (S.C.C.).
23
See John P.S. McLaren, “The Doukhobor Belief in Individual Faith and Conscience and
the Demands of the Secular State” in John McLaren & Harold Coward, eds., Religious Conscience,
the State, and the Law: Historical Contexts and Contemporary Significance (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1999), at 117.
24
R. v. Jack, [1985] S.C.J. No. 63, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.).
25
R. v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1997] O.J. No. 1548, 116 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
26
[1996] B.C.J. No. 2302, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (B.C.C.A.).
27
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
28
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
22
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implied limits on conscience-based objections to the application of the
criminal law:
I think this argument is utterly specious. The criminal law fundamentally
deals with right and wrong. The Criminal Code gives expression to
our society’s moral principles. Section 155 seeks to prevent the harm
to individuals and to the community caused by incest. The fact that the
offence is rooted in a moral principle developed within a religious
tradition cannot support a claim for interference with the freedom to
believe or not to believe under the Charter.29

The other case of unique interest is R. v. Morgentaler.30 The case is
remembered and treated primarily as a section 7 fundamental justice
case but it must be recalled that the challenge to section 251 of the
Criminal Code31 was also framed as a challenge based on section 2(a) of
the Charter. Given that the case ultimately turned on the section 7 question
and that both Dickson C.J.C. and Beetz J. declined to address the section
2(a) argument,32 it is not surprising that this dimension of the case is often
overlooked. Yet Wilson J., in reasons that have since grown in influence
and jurisprudential impact, gave an important place to the analysis
of freedom of religion and conscience in the constitutional review of
substantive criminal law. Justice Wilson embedded her consideration of
section 2(a) within an overarching section 7 analysis, reasoning that
“a deprivation of the section 7 right which has the effect of infringing a
right guaranteed elsewhere in the Charter cannot be in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice”.33 She held that the deprivation of
section 7 occasioned by section 251 offended section 2(a) of the Charter
“because . . . the decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is
essentially a moral decision, a matter of conscience” 34 and that the
conscience at issue in cases of abortion is the conscience of each individual
woman. Justice Wilson invoked Dickson C.J.C.’s discussion of freedom
of conscience in Big M35 and went on to note that “conscientious beliefs
which are not religiously motivated are equally protected” by section 2(a).
29

R. v. S. (M.), [1996] B.C.J. No. 2302, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 467, at 483-84 (B.C.C.A.).
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
31
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
32
Even the dissent dealt only passingly with Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
s. 2(a), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 156 (S.C.C.).
33
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 175 (S.C.C.).
34
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 175-76 (S.C.C.).
35
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
30
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“[T]he role,” she argued, “of the state in a democracy is to establish the
background conditions under which individual citizens may pursue the
ethical values which in their view underlie the good life.”36 In this case,
the criminal law was a threat to the liberty of citizens to pursue their visions
of the good life.
R. v. S. (M.)37 and Wilson J.’s reasoning in R. v. Morgentaler38
demonstrate the flip sides of the coin at issue when criminal laws are
challenged as contrary to section 2(a). On the one side one finds the moral
freedom represented by section 2(a) and, on the other, the moral regulation
inherent in the criminal law. Such cases, taking their cue from Big M,39
involve a sense of the threat that the criminal law poses to religion, but
also a recognition of the socially constitutive force of the criminal law.
2. The Criminal Law as a Means to Religious Freedom and
Equality
The impact of section 2(a) of the Charter on substantive criminal law
is felt most directly and, hence, appears most robustly in the jurisprudence
in cases that conform to the liberal model of negative rights: the
government acts as the singular antagonist of the individual and the
individual seeks — sometimes successfully, sometimes not — to repel
the coercive power of the state by invoking freedom of religion and
conscience. This is the picture of freedom and of rights painted in Big M40
and is the most apparent way in which the constitutional protection of
religious freedom and equality has affected the criminal law. The presence
of section 2(a) and the protection of religion in section 15(1) have had,
however, more structurally positive, though less obvious, influences on
substantive Canadian criminal law. In particular, there is a narrow range
of aspects of contemporary criminal law that reflects the very different
image of criminal law as a tool to secure and to facilitate the enjoyment
of religious freedom and equality. In these instances, aspects of criminal
law are either supported by or consciously crafted to protect religious
conscience.

36
37
38
39
40

R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 178 (S.C.C.).
[1996] B.C.J. No. 2302, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (B.C.C.A.).
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
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A fine example of a substantive criminal law that draws support
from the protection of religious freedom and equality is the prohibition
on hate speech found in section 319 of the Criminal Code.41 The offence
prohibits the wilful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups. As
a limitation on the scope of permitted expression, the provision was
challenged in R. v. Keegstra42 as contrary to freedom of expression. Mr.
Keegstra was a teacher in Eckville, Alberta, who taught his pupils that
Jews were “treacherous”, “subversive”, “sadistic”, and that they sought
to destroy Christianity. He also taught them that the Holocaust was
fabricated by the Jews to gain sympathy and that the Jewish people were
responsible for many of the ills of the world.
In reviewing the history of hate propaganda legislation, Dickson
C.J.C. emphasized the historical link between hate-speech laws and the
suppression of anti-Semitic and Nazi propaganda, and identified the
objective of section 319 as the prevention of discrimination against and
harms to the dignity of minority groups, as well as the avoidance of a
social message insidiously promoting a sense of the “racial or religious
inferiority”43 of some members of the community. In upholding the limit
on expressive rights as justified under section 1, Dickson C.J.C. drew
support for the provision from sections 15 and 27 of the Charter, which
reflect a “strong commitment to the values of equality and multiculturalism,
and hence underline the great importance of Parliament’s objective in
prohibiting hate propaganda”.44 In particular, the criminal prohibition on
hate speech was consistent with the recognition “that Canada possesses
a multicultural society in which the diversity and richness of various
cultural groups is a value to be protected and enhanced”.45 Section 319
reflected Parliament’s legitimate choice to “reduce racial, ethnic and
religious tension in Canada” by “suppress[ing] the wilful promotion of
hatred against identifiable groups”.46
The prohibition of hate speech thus stands as one example of a use
of the substantive criminal law to attempt to protect and facilitate
religious equality and freedom in Canada. The theory of such provisions
is that true equality and meaningful liberty cannot be achieved in a
society in which members of discrete minorities are subject to public
41
42
43
44
45
46

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 747-48 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 755 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 757 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 758 (S.C.C.).
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degradation and an atmosphere of legally abetted intolerance. On this
view, the criminal law has a positive role to play in creating a tolerant,
hospitable social environment conducive to the full recognition of the
dignity of others. At no point in R. v. Keegstra47 did the Court invoke
section 2(a) of the Charter, nor was this overtly treated as an instance of
a “conflict of rights” of the form we have become used to seeing in the
section 2(a) jurisprudence. Rather, in R. v. Keegstra we find an instance
in which the criminal law is actively deployed as an instrument in the
structuring of a public space in which religious and cultural diversity
can flourish without fear or discrimination. This is an arena in which the
Charter’s commitment to equality and multiculturalism — raised here in a
case of religious and cultural intolerance — buttressed the constitutionality
of an aggressive and highly contentious criminal law.
In such cases, we are up against a somewhat different but no less
interesting form of claim about the relationship between religion and
the criminal law than we saw with challenges to the constitutionality of
criminal laws on the basis of section 2(a). The majority decision in R. v.
Keegstra48 drips with approval for the morally constructive use of the
criminal law. As applied to religious freedom and tolerance of religious
difference, this is an attempt to use the force of the criminal law to
secure the normative difference that is characteristic of tolerance for
religious cultures. This is fascinatingly precarious terrain for the criminal
law to tread in a liberal democracy, as was made eminently clear in R. v.
Zundel.49 Only two years after R. v. Keegstra, the majority of the Court
invalidated section 181 of the Criminal Code,50 the false news provision.
In a case involving the attempt to use the criminal law to limit the
expression of virulent anti-Semitism, the majority found that, even if
section 181 was designed to promote the kind of social and religious
tolerance upon which the constitutionality of the statute in R. v. Keegstra
turned, in this case the legislation failed at the proportionality stage. The
reasoning found in Cory and Iacobucci JJ.’s spirited dissent is of most
interest for present purposes. The dissenting justices emphasize that the
provision in question “provides protection, by criminal sanction, not only to
Jewish Canadians but to all vulnerable minority groups and individuals”.51
47
48
49
50
51

[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.).
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.).
[1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.).
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, at 809 (S.C.C.).
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The argument for the use of the criminal law in the protection of religious
freedom and equality could not have been made more sharply and
passionately:
The tragedy of the Holocaust and the enactment of the Charter have
served to emphasize the laudable s. 181 aim of preventing the harmful
effects of false speech and thereby promoting racial and social tolerance.
In fact, it was in part the publication of the evil and invidious statements
that were known to be false by those that made them regarding the
Jewish people that [led] the way to the inferno of the Holocaust. The
realities of Canada’s multicultural society emphasize the vital need to
protect minorities and preserve Canada’s mosaic of cultures. 52

Again, one does not find a direct application of the right to freedom
of religion or religious equality in this dissent. Instead, one finds a
strident defence of a substantive criminal law that draws support from
the ethic of religious freedom and tolerance reflected in the Charter.
The laws prohibiting hate speech and false news are emblematic of
this second relationship between the constitutional protection of religious
liberties and the substantive criminal law. Similar sentiments can be found
in other, less visibly and hotly debated, aspects of contemporary criminal
law. For example, Parliament’s statement of the principles of sentencing
includes a direction that the fact that a crime was motivated by religious
bias, prejudice or hate should be treated as an aggravating factor. Although
not conventionally thought of as an aspect of substantive criminal law,
such sentencing directions are reasonably conceived of as normative
“riders” on substantive laws, outlining the circumstances of an offence
that ought to attract particular social disapprobation. No doubt enacted
for historical reasons unlinked to notions of expansive religious tolerance,
other examples of this affirmative use of the criminal law can nevertheless
be found in certain substantive criminal offences that specifically protect
religious gatherings and the conduct of religious ceremonies.53 Furthermore,
52

R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, at 820 (S.C.C.).
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 176. See R. v. Skoke-Graham, [1985] S.C.J. No. 6,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 106 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Skoke-Graham”], in which the offence of disturbing religious
worship was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada. This is a fascinating case from Nova
Scotia in which the Court was faced with six accused who were charged with having repeatedly
insisted on kneeling to receive communion, rejecting a diocesan directive that communion should
be received by parishioners while standing rather than kneeling. In each instance, the priest asked
the accused to stand, at which point they returned to their seats without receiving communion.
Although the courts below convicted, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, entering acquittals.
Justice Dickson, writing for the majority, reasoned that the brevity and peacefulness of the
“disturbance” meant that it did not constitute “disorder” and, hence, could not found a conviction
53
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in 2001, Parliament amended section 430 of the Criminal Code,54 adding
subsection (4.1):
(4.1) Every one who commits mischief in relation to property that
is a building, structure or part thereof that is primarily used for religious
worship, including a church, mosque, synagogue or temple, or an
object associated with religious worship located in or on the grounds
of such a building or structure, or a cemetery, if the commission of the
mischief is motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on religion,
race, colour or national or ethnic origin,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding ten years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen
months.

Speaking to this provision before Parliament, Ms Sarmite Bulte,
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Heritage, characterized
this as a “very serious offence” that was designed to “better protect from
hatred those who have become vulnerable because they belong to a group
distinguished by factors such as race, religion or ethnic origin”.55 The
facilitative role of the criminal law with respect to religious freedom
was most apparent when Ms Bulte explained that the government’s chief
concern was that “[s]uch mischief would create fear among worshippers
of a specific religion and divert them from the practise of their religion”.56
In all of these cases, the substantive criminal law, though not directly
subject to Charter scrutiny, derives support and authority from the
constitutional protection of religious conscience. This is a less visible,
though no less significant, influence of religious freedom and equality
on the substantive criminal law.

under (then) s. 172. In separate concurring reasons, Wilson J. took a somewhat different tack, but
also concluded that the activities in question were not of the sort contemplated by Parliament in
creating this crime. She also argued that there were sound policy reasons to resist an interpretation
of the provision that would “make the criminal law available as a tool for the enforcement of
liturgical practice or the settlement of liturgical disputes” (at 134). The case is also interesting
insofar as the Court concluded that an offence with explicitly religious purposes that “serves the
needs of public morality” (at 115) was intra vires the federal government by virtue of the criminal
law power.
54
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
55
House of Commons Debates, No. 095 (October 16, 2001), at 1235 (Sarmite Bulte).
56
House of Commons Debates, No. 095 (October 16, 2001), at 1235 (Sarmite Bulte).
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3. The Constitutional Protection of Religion as an Interpretive
Resource in the Criminal Law
This last category of possible influences of the constitutional protection
of religion on the criminal law involves neither claims that criminal
laws interfere with religious liberty or equality nor arguments garnering
support for criminal laws from constitutional commitments to religious
diversity and equality. Instead, what I have in mind are those ways in
which the constitutional protection of religion might be seen to influence
the judicial interpretation and construction of those myriad criminal law
concepts that rely upon assumptions about what is of social value, what
affects our perception of events, and what moulds our reactions to the
events that take place in the world, rendering them subjectively genuine or
objectively reasonable, as the case may be. This arena of subtle influence
has, perhaps, the greatest potential for impact on the day-to-day application
of the criminal law but is, as yet, the least judicially explored.
Though an evidence case, R. v. Gruenke57 provides an example of
this kind of interpretive influence of the constitutional protection of
religion. In that case, the majority of the Court concluded that, although
a class privilege for religious communications was not required by virtue
of section 2(a), a case-by-case privilege for religious communications
could be recognized when “the individual’s freedom of religion [would]
be imperilled by the admission of the evidence”.58 Chief Justice Lamer
reasoned that the appropriate means of taking account of section 2(a) in
the application of the common law of evidence was to allow the caseby-case criteria, or “Wigmore factors”, to “be informed . . . by the Charter
guarantee of freedom of religion”.59 What we see here is the application
and interpretation of the common law being influenced by the presence
of the Charter protection of religious freedom; this is so independently
of the rule that the common law should be developed in keeping with
those more general, elusive and protean “Charter values”.60 Though it is
drawn from the realm of criminal evidence, R. v. Gruenke shows with

57

[1991] S.C.J. No. 80, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Gruenke, [1991] S.C.J. No. 80, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263, at 290 (S.C.C.).
59
R. v. Gruenke, [1991] S.C.J. No. 80, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263, at 290 (S.C.C.).
60
R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, at 675 (S.C.C.); see Health
Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J.
No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, at para. 81 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “HEU”], for a list of Charter values. See text
accompanying note 95, below.
58
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clarity and transparency the manner in which the interpretation of common
law tests is influenced by the constitutional protection of religion.
As Christine Boyle argued in her 1994 article assessing the role of
equality in criminal law, the principal locus for this kind of soft interpretive
effect of a Charter right on substantive criminal law is in the criminal
law’s use of objective “reasonableness” tests.61 It is now perhaps trite to
observe that whenever the law employs the “reasonable person” as a
diagnostic for determining acceptable conduct, it relies upon a fiction
constructed with assumptions and judgments about normativity. In a
society committed to multiculturalism and religious pluralism, the issue
thus arises: is the reasonable criminal law actor a religious person? Do the
beliefs, commitments and world views that comprise religious conscience
have relevance when assessing whether a person acted reasonably? And,
in particular, does the presence of the Charter protection of religious
freedom in section 2(a) and religious equality in section 15(1) guarantee
to the citizen that this should be so?
These questions are, in my view, one of the frontiers in thinking
about the relationship between the constitutional protection of religion
and the substantive criminal law. This is an area in which we are
beginning to witness the seed planted by Dickson C.J.C. in Big M62 —
the creeping recognition that the morality pursued by the criminal law may
circumscribe the moral freedom guaranteed by section 2(a) — coming to
fruition. Crimes that involve objective forms of mens rea and defences
that test the accused’s conduct against that of a “reasonable person” all
potentially raise this question of how to conceive of the objective actor
and the impact, if any, of section 2(a) on the construction of this
hypothetical subject. One imagines, for example, the adjudication of a
claim of necessity or duress being informed by a religiously or culturally
influenced sense of the range of “reasonable alternatives”. 63 As I will
demonstrate below, the fraught law of provocation shows that the
61

Christine Boyle, “The Role of Equality in Criminal Law” (1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev. 203,

at 212.
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R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Cultural Defense (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004), in which the author argues for the formal recognition of a cultural defence.
Such a defence must, at minimum, guarantee “not only that cultural evidence be admitted into the
courtroom, but also that the cultural logic must be taken seriously” (at 14). Renteln argues from the
premise that, for all people, “culture shapes cognition and conduct”, concluding that “[i]n pluralistic
societies, it is especially vital that judges acknowledge variation in motives to better understand the
behavior of individuals who come before them” (at 6). It should be noted that Renteln is interested
in the “cultural defence” as it is raised both within and beyond the criminal law.
63
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imaginative leap required is a small one. Indeed, the legitimacy of taking
account of the religious beliefs of an accused who claims to have been
provoked to kill is a live issue in substantive criminal law, largely because
the beliefs that form the basis of these claims grate so powerfully against
what should be our fierce commitment to gender equality. In this respect,
the “soft” influence of religious freedom on the substantive criminal law
puts us squarely against the hard issue that I suggested is coming to
characterize the relationship between criminal law and the constitutional
protection of religion: when does the moral liberty assured by section
2(a) give way to the moral imperatives of society at large as reflected
and enforced by criminal law?

III. RELIGION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW AT ODDS
Thus far, I have shown that there is a story to be told about
the relationship between the constitutional protection of religion and
substantive Canadian criminal law. This relationship has been more or
less subtle and has demanded some excavation to reveal. This story has
been an interesting one, in part, because it has disclosed different faces
of an interplay between the socially constructive ends of the criminal
law and religion/religious liberty as an object of social construction.
When the influence of sections 2(a) and 15(1) of the Charter has taken
the form of arguments for the constitutional invalidity of criminal law,
I have argued that the underlying dynamic is one wherein the moral
freedom suggested by the protection of religious conscience has been
tested against the morally constitutive role of substantive criminal law.
The second form of influence — the use of the constitutional protection
of religious freedom and equality as a resource from which to draw
support for criminal laws — has inverted this dynamic, snapping the
normative force of the criminal law squarely behind and in aid of the moral
and cultural diversity sought by religious freedom and equality. When
the law is called upon to interpret and apply the quotidian concepts of
substantive criminal law with religious freedoms in mind, which of
these two dynamics will prevail is a question left open: will concepts such
as “reasonableness” be an instrument of circumscription, as suggested in
Big M,64 or is this precisely the place at which the arguments for a
religiously inclusive sense of “ordinary” lived experience is most pressing?
64

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
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Once this charged dynamic at play in the relationship between
substantive criminal law and the constitutional protection of religion has
been uncovered, it appears somewhat remarkable that there has been
so little jurisprudential and scholarly debate on this area of CriminalConstitutional law. Despite the social crucible that this dynamic represents,
since Big M,65 principled engagements with the difficult issues that
characterize the interaction between substantive criminal law and religion
have been comparatively few. In those cases in which this interaction
has been addressed, the issues have not been cast as I have suggested
and the stakes that I have described have not been explicitly drawn out
for scrutiny and discussion.
But the ground now seems to be shifting. Cases are emerging in
which claims of religious freedom and equality are putting hard questions
to substantive criminal law. I want to look particularly to two contemporary
examples, both of which show a slightly different face of the surfacing
moral dynamic that subtends this relatively unexamined area. Before
doing so, a word or two is in order about why this issue, largely dormant
for so long, has now become so volatile. Why is it that, in the past few
years, we are seeing so much more clearly the fraught entanglement of
the protection of religious liberties and the substantive criminal law?
1. Accounting for the Awakening
It is an inherently perilous undertaking to attempt to provide causative
explanations for the emergence of legal issues at a given point in the
jurisprudential life of a country. Furthermore, satisfying explanations
are more likely to lie in the mouths of social historians rather than
theorists of constitutional and criminal law. Nevertheless, as one looks
at this incipiently fraught relationship between substantive criminal law
and the constitutional protection of religious liberties, certain trends in
the law on both sides of the aisle are, at minimum, suggestive of why the
provocative moral dynamic that exists between these two areas at the
level of theory seems to be manifesting in lived reality.
Over the last 15 years or so, substantive criminal law has weathered
something of a muting of its moral urgency. Viewed against this trend,
R. v. S. (M.)66 is precisely an interesting case because Donald J.’s unabashed
assertion that the criminal law “gives expression to our society’s moral
65
66
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principles” stands firmly against the main current of judicial statements
about the nature of criminal law in the Charter era. In a number of
dimensions of substantive criminal law, the courts have sounded a
general retreat from more overt forms of the claim that, whatever else it
is also doing, the criminal law is essentially engaged in communicating
and enforcing societal norms. To be sure, the courts have confirmed, not
resiled from, the facial legal position that a valid criminal law may
pursue moral ends, the position reflected in Rand J.’s definition of the
criminal law power articulated in the Margarine Reference.67 Indeed, in
R. v. Malmo-Levine,68 the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed this
definition of the Federal criminal law power as it nominally rejected the
notion that the harm principle — that classic liberal block on morals
legislation — was a principle of fundamental justice.69 I say “nominally”
because, despite its statements about the legitimacy of morals regulation,
the Court in R. v. Malmo-Levine ultimately leaned on the existence of
harm and, in doing so, fell into line with the general pattern in the
contemporary interpretation of the criminal law. This pattern is most
apparent in the realm of indecency and obscenity, areas of substantive
criminal law whose application seems to call most plainly for a kind of
case-by-case moral judgment. Yet even in this most overtly moral of
criminal arenas, the recent case of R. v. Labaye70 has marked the
culmination of a transformation of the standard for both obscenity and
indecency “from a community standards test to a harm-based test”.71
The test for indecency and obscenity now “amounts to a test of harm
incompatible with society’s proper functioning”.72
Of course, as the Court itself accepted in R. v. Malmo-Levine,73 the
substitution of harm for community standards does not eradicate the
moral content of criminal law but, rather, leaves it to the second-order

67
Reference re Dairy Industry Act (Canada) S. 5(a), [1948] S.C.J. No. 42, [1949] S.C.R. 1
(S.C.C.), affd [1951] A.C. 179, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 689 (P.C.). Justice Rand held, at 50 (S.C.R.), that a
valid criminal law required a prohibition, a penalty and a valid criminal law purpose; he further
explained that “[p]ublic peace, order, security, health, morality; these are the ordinary though not
exclusive ends served by that law”.
68
[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.).
69
R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 74 (S.C.C.).
70
[2005] S.C.J. No. 83, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 (S.C.C.).
71
R. v. Labaye, [2005] S.C.J. No. 83, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728, at para. 20 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Labaye, [2005] S.C.J. No. 83, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728, at para. 23 (S.C.C.).
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[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.).
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question of what “counts” as a harm.74 Although the majority in R. v.
Labaye suggests the solution that the harm must be “grounded in norms
which our society has formally recognized in its Constitution or similar
fundamental laws”,75 this answer really just begs the question that I am
identifying as key to contemporary thinking on this side of the religioncriminal law equation: what are the appropriate limits of the criminal law?
As a device of moral enforcement, the criminal law is powerfully illiberal;76
yet we live under the profound ethical influence of a quintessentially
liberal document, the Charter. Courts have been caught in the resulting
cross-currents. As a result, whether by opting for more objective-sounding
language of harm in criminal offences or by attempting to extract the
question of moral blame from the law of criminal defences, 77 courts
have attempted to shuffle the overtly moral dimensions of the criminal
law to the next room like that bilious old uncle at a family gathering.
Doing so, however, has merely emphasized the gap between the irreducibly
moral components of the criminal law and the normatively cleansed
reasoning found in criminal judgments. Faced with this gap, serious
thought is again being given to the moral limits of the criminal law.78

74
Another way of characterizing this same point would be to say that reliance on the harm
principle nevertheless leaves open the question of the magnitude or seriousness of harm necessary
to warrant criminal sanction. See Alan Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law: Studies in Hegelian
Jurisprudence (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1995), at 211. Brudner’s position
is that “disrespect for another’s freedom . . . and not the infliction of harm is the gravamen of crime”.
75
R. v. Labaye, [2005] S.C.J. No. 83, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728, at para. 30 (S.C.C.). Chief
Justice McLachlin is, here, elaborating upon an idea in Sopinka J.’s decision in R. v. Butler, [1992]
S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 493 (S.C.C.), wherein he stated that harm to values might
count as harms capable of supporting an obscenity conviction, but only if the materials in question
“undermine another basic Charter right” or if the moral disapprobation “has its basis in Charter
values”.
76
To say this is not to deny that other aspects of the criminal law reflect and enforce
certain key liberal commitments such as defence of rights — property and personal — and respect
for freedom and autonomous choice. See Alan Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law: Studies in
Hegelian Jurisprudence (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1995), at 211ff.
77
R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 41 (S.C.C.): “Once the
elements of the offence have been established, the accused can no longer be considered blameless.
This Court has never taken the concept of blamelessness any further than this initial finding of
guilt, nor should it in this case.” For critical reflection on the Court’s use of the concept of moral
involuntariness as the new lodestar in criminal defences, see Stanley Yeo, “Challenging Moral
Involuntariness as a Principle of Fundamental Justice” (2002) 28 Queens L.J. 335; Benjamin L.
Berger, “Emotions and the Veil of Voluntarism: The Loss of Judgment in Canadian Criminal Law”
(2006) 51 McGill L.J. 99.
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See, e.g., J. Paul McCutcheon, “Morality and the Criminal Law: Reflections on HartDevlin” (2002) 47:1 Crim. L.Q. 15, concluding, at 38, that “it must be accepted that it is legitimate and
appropriate to take moral considerations into account in determining the contents of the criminal law”.
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A notably parallel set of questions is being asked in the realm of the
constitutional protection of religion. Looked at from within the culture
of Canadian constitutionalism, religion appears primarily as a matter of
individual flourishing and an expression of autonomy and choice. 79
Operating with this understanding of religion in hand, the Court has
recently adopted an unprecedentedly expansive reading of section 2(a),
holding that it protects against all non-trivial interferences with the
sincerely held faith-based convictions of an individual, irrespective of
the views of any larger community of belief.80 This construction of section
2(a) ensures that the courts will not be put in a position of having to judge
the authenticity or merit of religious belief or the inherent acceptability
of religious practice. With this holding, the Court has also sidelined the
question of internal limits on freedom of religion, a question that has
troubled the Court’s section 2(a) jurisprudence since an inherent limit
was first implied in Big M.81 But this move away from internal limits also
became something of a case of jumping out of the frying pan and into the
fire. However justifiable, this expansive protection of religious conscience
means that all questions of religious freedom raised under section 2(a)
effectively become issues of justified state limitation under section 1 of
the Charter. Furthermore, as a prohibited ground of discrimination listed
in section 15(1) of the Charter, religion, like other identity-based grounds,
is entitled to the respect of the state and equal protection and benefit of
the law. Yet religious identity is, in certain important ways, distinct from
many other forms of identity.82 Definitionally cultural, religion not only
shapes one’s sense of self and community, but also shapes beliefs and
motivates action. The demand to give equal protection to a world view
complete with beliefs and practices — some of which might grate strongly
against law’s own symbolic commitments, including its sense of authority
and value — raises its own unique challenges and poses sharply the
question of limits on religious tolerance.
The world in which the law now operates is, of course, also one
characterized by deep religious diversity of a form not felt even when
79

Benjamin L. Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall

L.J. 277.
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For an excellent discussion of the identity-based components of religious freedom and
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Big M83 was decided. Furthermore, as both Chamberlain84 and the academic
commentary attest, conceptions of secularism have become increasingly
contested and the assignation of religion to private life has proven unstable.
Some religious communities are making claims to increased legal selfdetermination, while others are calling out and objecting to the feltoppressiveness of constitutional liberalism. Many of the legal cases that
have emerged as a result have taken the juridical form of a conflict of
rights or Charter values, most frequently pitting religious freedom against
the powerful constitutional commitment to equality and autonomy. Such
cases have put into question the aesthetically desirable but pragmatically
implausible claim that there is no hierarchy of rights, while forcing deep
public thought about the nature of our commitment to various constitutional
goods and the lengths to which we will go to protect them. The legal
analysis of religious freedom has, thus, shifted attention increasingly to
the question of how to manage conflicts of rights and how to conceive
of the limits of religious freedom. Indeed, from Trinity Western85 to
Multani86 and the Same-Sex Marriage Reference87 the single question
that has defined contemporary constitutional protection of religion under
the Charter has been that of defining the limits of religious freedom.
In the end, then, when one looks at the modern fixations of both the
substantive criminal law and the constitutional protection of religion, it
seems hardly surprising that these two areas would soon meet. At the
same time that the criminal law has become a site for debate about the
limits of moral regulation, the question that has occupied thought in the
realm of religious freedoms and equality is the question of the justified
limits on normative difference. These questions are contesting the same
boundary from different sides. Both questions are interested in the capacity
of the law to make moral judgments and impose them upon those who
might not agree with or conform to those judgments. Both questions put
liberal public law in the uncomfortable position of having to confront its
willingness to be illiberal. It is only very recently that these interesting
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(S.C.C.).
85
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convergent questions have crystallized across this as-yet relatively untested
boundary. Now that they have, in the words of Henry V, the game is afoot.
2. A Preliminary Note: The Charter as False Comfort
Before turning to two examples that display this moral dynamic at play
in the interaction of the constitutional protection of religion and the
substantive criminal law, a general comment is in order about the role of
the Charter and Charter reasoning in such cases.
In his important book on the role of moral principles in the conduct of
constitutional self-government in the United States, Christopher Eisgruber
identifies certain fallacies that plague the interpretation of constitutional
law and, in so doing, impede our capacity to see clearly the stakes of
and nature of constitutional law and reasoning.88 The “aesthetic fallacy”
inheres in the belief that a constitution is coherent, non-redundant and
rationally consistent.89 Instead, he argues, judges should recognize that
the constitution reflects a set of political compromises and, as such, leaves
gaps and contains inconsistencies. To this, I would add the consequential
observation that the aesthetic fallacy prevents one from seeing that a
constitution may generate as many conflicts as it appears to resolve.
This last observation points to a way in which Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence has laboured under something akin to the aesthetic fallacy.
In so very many areas of Canadian law, an attempt is made to palliate
moral contention by recourse to Charter rights or values. The admonition
to develop the common law in keeping with Charter values is well
established.90 More recently, the Court has held that the Charter itself
“should be interpreted in a way that maintains its underlying values and
its internal coherence”.91 Indeed, in R. v. Labaye,92 mentioned briefly above,
McLachlin C.J.C. conceded the difficulty inherent in defining the types
of harms cognizable in criminal indecency but sought to resolve this
difficulty by answering that, to support a criminal conviction based on
indecency, the harm must be “grounded in norms which our society has
88

Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2001).
89
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2001), at 113-15.
90
R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.).
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Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, at para. 80 (S.C.C.).
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formally recognized in its Constitution or similar fundamental laws”.93
In so doing, she sought to resolve the second-order moral debate about what
“counts” as harm by resort to the values enshrined in the Constitution.94
There are two principal problems with advancing Charter rights and
values as means of resolving moral disputes, the second more intractable
than the first. Most obviously, this elevation of the Charter as not just a
legal instrument but an expression of the core values of the community
takes the scope and content of these values off the table for debate —
they have already been decided and can be found in the Charter. But
perhaps many are prepared, as I am, to engage in a defence of those values
as just and good. The much more problematic aspect of this prevalent
move brings us back to the aesthetic fallacy. The invocation of the Charter
as a mechanism of resolving moral contention assumes a coherence within
and among those values that simply does not exist. What are these elusive
“Charter values”? In HEU, the Court listed “[h]uman dignity, equality,
liberty, respect for the autonomy of the person and the enhancement
of democracy” as among these values.95 Not only are these concepts
tremendously porous and, thus, eminently open to the kind of normative
contestation that the offer of the Charter as a device of resolution seeks
to avoid, but there is ample room within these values, and in the variety
of rights from which they flow, for claims that involve conflicting
Charter values or (as we have so often seen in recent years) conflicting
Charter rights. To give but the most patent example, the concepts of
equality and liberty have certain fundamental cross-currents such that the
claim that one must be protected readily provokes a claim that the other
is being diminished. The point is that, rather than being resolved by the
invocation of such values, the most difficult questions of constitutional and
criminal law arise precisely when the content and interaction of rights and
principles like “equality”, “autonomy” and “human dignity” are at issue.
As much as anything else, the two examples of recent fraught
intersections of the constitutional protection of religion and substantive
criminal law that follow demonstrate how little recourse to the Charter
93
R. v. Labaye, [2005] S.C.J. No. 83, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728, at para. 30 (S.C.C.). See also
note 75 above and accompanying text.
94
There is something of an irony in this aspect of R. v. Labaye, [2005] S.C.J. No. 83,
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 (S.C.C.). Chief Justice McLachlin takes pains to distinguish the moral and legal
meanings of indecency, confining the Court’s interest to the first; yet when the test for indecency is
posed, the legal and moral are pushed back together. The test turns on offence to core community
values, which are the moral principles found in basic legal documents.
95
Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, at para. 81 (S.C.C.).
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resolves. Almost any assertion of criminal misconduct involves claims
that the autonomy, liberty, human dignity and equality of a victim or set
of victims was harmed or put in jeopardy. The core rights and values found
in the Charter are thus engaged. Equally, the threat of criminal sanction
necessarily carries with it a threat to the autonomy, liberty, human dignity
and, often, equality of the accused. Again, the core rights and values found
in the Charter are thus engaged. When, as we find in these examples,
religious freedom is on the table, the conundrum is further deepened. When
it comes to normative debate, the Charter conjures much but resolves little.
In this vein, the following examples demonstrate the way in which
looking to the interaction of constitutional and criminal law can tell us a
great deal about the nature of each. But, for present purposes, the most
palpable lesson from the cases that follow is the way in which the
intersection of substantive criminal law and religious liberties — with
its inherent and evocative potential for cross-cutting claims about moral
freedom — puts us uniquely and squarely against hard questions of
genuine moral judgment.
3. Religion and Provocation
The first example of the extrusion of the moral dynamic between
religious freedom and substantive criminal law that I offer arises in the
modern crucible of criminal law — the working out of the balance
between subjective fault and the criminal law’s demands for objectively
reasonable conduct. The defence of provocation is an acutely problematic
creature of history and necessity. Its history lies in the criminal law’s
protection of norms of male honour and offence,96 a history that still
plagues this defence’s disproportionate use to partially excuse male
violence against women.97 Accordingly, the defence has been forcefully
96
See Janey Greene, “A Provocation Defence for Battered Women Who Kill” (1989) 12 Adel.
L. Rev. 145; JaneMaree Maher et al., “Honouring White Masculinity: Culture, Terror, Provocation
and the Law” (2005) 23 Austl. Feminist L.J. 147 (arguing not only that the provocation defence
preserves very particular norms of male behaviour, but that it has the potential to condemn and
exclude other forms of masculinity associated with non-Western cultures).
97
See Don Stuart & Ronald J. Delisle, eds., Learning Canadian Criminal Law, 9th ed.
(Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2004), at 1045 and David Winkler, “Comments on the Defence of
Provocation” in Gerry Ferguson & Stanley Yeo, eds., The Law of Homicide, Provocation and SelfDefence: Canadian, Australian and other Asia-Pacific Perspectives (Victoria: Centre for Asia-Pacific
Initiatives, 2000) 85, at 88. Both authors also note, however, that the defence tends not to be
successful. See also Nicola Cheyne & Susan Dennison, “An Examination of a Potential Reform to
the Provocation Defence: The Impact of Gender of the Defendant and the Suddenness Requirement”
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attacked as a threat to gender equality in a number of ways, including its
apparent condoning of sudden violence as an expected reaction to some
forms of affront 98 and the very narrow range of emotions that it has
classically recognized as the basis for a partial excuse. 99 Of course,
nothing prevents the existence of provoking circumstances from being
factored in when arriving at a just sentence — and herein lies its source
in necessity. The provocation defence established in section 232 of the
Criminal Code100 is, in many ways, best seen as a pseudo-sentencing
provision whose real effect is to mitigate the potential harshness of the
minimum sentences associated with murder. Indeed, the only effect of
the defence of provocation is to reduce murder to manslaughter, thereby
opening up the full range of sentencing options; otherwise put, provocation
exists specifically and exclusively as a response to a minimum sentence
for murder. Cogent arguments based on one or both of these features have
been advanced to abolish or substantially revise the provocation defence.
But the dimension of this defence that is of interest as a flashpoint
for the moral dynamic between the constitutional protection of religion
and the socially constructive role of the criminal law lies neither in history
nor in necessity but, rather, in the analytic structure called for in assessing
claims of provocation. In the law of provocation one finds an example
of the third form of interaction of law and religion described above, the
influence of the imperative of religious freedom and equality on the
interpretation of basic criminal law concepts. Specifically, what effect, if
any, should the religious belonging of an accused have on the construction
(2005) 12:2 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 388, at 388-89, in which the authors note a gender
bias in “the differing outcomes for male and female defendants invoking the defence”.
98
See, e.g., Stella Tarrant, “The ‘Specific Triggering Incident’ in Provocation: Is the Law
Gender Biased?” (1996) 26 West. Aust. L. Rev. 190.
99
See, e.g., Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1992),
at 192; Isabel Grant, Dorothy Chunn & Christine Boyle, The Law of Homicide (Scarborough, ON.:
Carswell, 1999), at §6.2; Victoria F. Nourse, “Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the
Provocation Defense” (1997) 106:5 Yale L.J. 1331 (advocating a more nuanced approach to
emotion in the law of provocation and, ultimately, arguing that the defence should be retained but
only in those instances in which the accused’s emotional judgments mirror those of the law). See
also Adrian Howe, “Provocation in Crisis — Law’s Passion at the Crossroads? New Directions for
Feminist Strategists” (2004) 21 Austl. Feminist L.J. 53 (arguing for the abolition of the provocation
defence owing to the manner in which it entrenches male privilege); Stanley Yeo, “The Role of
Gender in the Law of Provocation” (1997) 26:4 Anglo-American L. Rev. 431 (arguing that the law
of provocation has an untapped potential to take account of the realities of women as well as men);
Caroline Forell, “Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United States, Canada,
and Australia” (2006) 14 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y 27 (arguing that modern social norms have
worked their way into the law of provocation in all three jurisdictions and, as such, reform of the
law of provocation may not be as necessary as is often assumed).
100
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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of the reasonable person? In R. v. Hill101 and R. v. Thibert,102 the Supreme
Court of Canada has explained that a successful defence of provocation
demands that three criteria be established: (1) that there was a wrongful act
or insult sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of self-control; (2) that
the accused actually acted on this wrongful act or insult; and (3) that the
killing happened “on the sudden and before there was time for passions
to cool”. The contentious aspect of this test has been the first prong. In
particular, in light of the statutory language demanding that the insult be
sufficient to deprive an “ordinary person” of self-control, but given the
countervailing imperative to treat culpability for murder as a matter of
subjective fault,103 of what relevance are the personal characteristics of
the accused? The Supreme Court has answered that the standard of selfcontrol must be a dominantly objective test, but that to properly assess
the gravity of the insult, the ordinary person must “share with the accused
such other factors as would give the act or insult in question a special
significance”.104
What no doubt appeared as but a sliver of subjectivity injected into
the law of provocation has been driven open by the recently asked question
of whether the cultural and, specifically, religious views of the accused
should be considered in assessing the gravity of the insult.105 As argued
above, this particular question is so explosive in the context of provocation
because, unlike the kinds of attributes contemplated and used as examples
by the Court in R. v. Thibert106 (race, primarily), religious belonging is a
somewhat unique form of identity characteristic. That a person possesses
the “feature” of being religious imports the possibility for a wide range
of thickly normative assumptions about a just and good “order of things”,
assumptions that will gild a given set of events with “special significance”
101
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and will do so in a manner that puts value judgments at the core of the
controversy.107 Provocation is already a normatively problematic defence.
Yet if the beliefs and judgments that inform the accused’s perception of
an act or insult as wrongful conflict with core public commitments,
another layer of complexity is added. In such situations, the role of the
criminal law in enforcing a moral vision is apparent and the consequent
challenge is deciding where the line will be drawn between the moral
coerciveness of criminal law and the moral freedom suggested by our
commitment to religious pluralism.
The two appellate courts that have recently taken up this question
have adopted very different postures. In R. v. Nahar,108 the accused was
charged with the murder of his wife. At trial, he argued that he was
provoked by aspects of her behaviour, including her smoking, drinking
and the fact that she socialized with other men. In particular, he claimed
he was provoked because this behaviour was “completely at odds with
the culture and tradition of the Sikh community in which they were
raised”.109 He argued that, in the circumstances of the case, the ordinary
person should be a person from that cultural background “to whom Ms.
Nahar’s ongoing behaviour, and what she said and did immediately
before Mr. Nahar stabbed her, would have been as significant as it was
to Mr. Nahar”.110 Although the appeal from conviction was ultimately
dismissed, the B.C. Court of Appeal agreed that the culture and/or
religion of the accused is relevant to assessing the gravity of insult.
Referring to Cory J.’s reasoning in R. v. Thibert,111 the Court concluded
that “factors that give an act or insult a special significance could be
said to include the implications of an accused person having been raised
in a particular culture”.112
Justice Doherty considered this issue in R. v. Humaid.113 In that case,
the accused, who killed his wife, Aysar Abbas, claimed that he was
provoked by a comment she made that he took to be an admission of
107
Value judgments in addition, that is, to the core judgment about the use of violence
problematically and not-so-tacitly assumed in the very defence of provocation. As Murphy J.,
dissenting from the judgment of the Australian High Court, stated, “the ordinary or reasonable man
simply does not kill if he is provoked” (R. v. Moffa (1976-77), 13 A.L.R. 225, at 244 (Aust. H.C.)).
108
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113
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infidelity. Mr. Humaid, who was Muslim, had led expert evidence at trial
to the following effect:
Dr. Ayoub testified that the Islamic culture was male dominated and
placed great significance on the concept of family honour. Infidelity,
particularly infidelity by a female member of a family, was considered
a very serious violation of the family’s honour and worthy of harsh
punishment by the male members of the family. 114

The trial judge, however, had instructed the jury that they should not
regard the ordinary person as sharing the accused’s religion, culture or
customs. Justice Doherty found no error in this regard,115 reasoning that,
in the absence of evidence specifically linking the accused to these sets
of beliefs, to ascribe these characteristics to the accused “is an invitation
to assign group characteristics to the appellant based on what can only be
described as stereotyping”.116 Accordingly, he reasoned that, “[a]ssuming
that an accused’s religious and cultural beliefs that are antithetical to
fundamental Canadian values such as the equality of men and women
can ever have a role to play”117 in the provocation analysis, the evidence
adduced in this case could be of no assistance to the accused.
Although he concluded that the issue of whether religious beliefs
should be part of the legal construction of the ordinary person should be
left to another case in which the issue squarely arose, Doherty J. did not
leave the tone of skepticism in this last statement unexplored. In his
obiter comments he expressed, in no uncertain terms, his view —
contrary to that of the B.C. Court of Appeal — that the religious beliefs
of an accused should be relevant in the assessment of provocation only
when that religion or those beliefs are the very target of the wrongful act
or insult. In so doing, he laid his finger on precisely the deep issue of

114
R. v. Humaid, [2006] O.J. No. 1507, 37 C.R. (6th) 347, at para. 67 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 232 (S.C.C.).
115
Justice Doherty also found, however, that there was, on the evidence, no air of reality to
the defence of provocation.
116
R. v. Humaid, [2006] O.J. No. 1507, 37 C.R. (6th) 347, at para. 83 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 232 (S.C.C.). Justice Doherty went on to explain that
“[i]ndividual free choice and individual responsibility for those choices are at the core of the
Canadian notion of criminal responsibility. Verdicts that are the product of stereotyping are no less
offensive because they benefit the accused.” Although he did not cast it in this way, Doherty J.’s
concerns are consistent with a legitimate anxiety about such claims about culture as essentialist and
reinforcing orientalist narratives when not subjected to critical examination in each case.
117
R. v. Humaid, [2006] O.J. No. 1507, 37 C.R. (6th) 347, at para. 82 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 232 (S.C.C.).

542

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

moral diversity versus moral enforcement raised by the intersection of
religion and substantive criminal law:
. . . It is arguable that as a matter of criminal law policy, the “ordinary
person” cannot be fixed with beliefs that are irreconcilable with
fundamental Canadian values. Criminal law may simply not accept that
a belief system which is contrary to those fundamental values should
somehow provide the basis for a partial defence to murder.118

Of course, as I have argued above, the invocation of “fundamental
Canadian values” marks, rather than eradicates, the essential issue raised
by religion in the defence of provocation. The telling point, rather, is
that beneath Doherty J.’s statement is a judgment about the role of the
criminal law in forcefully pursuing our moral commitment to gender
equality. Yet this question was already present before religion became
an issue for the defence. As Kent Roach has observed, the defence of
provocation already “embrace[s] as part of the ordinary person, a culture
of masculinity that is possessive, short-tempered, and violent”.119 The
general tendency, however, to focus upon the facially neutral concept of
“loss of control” obscured the need to grapple with the moral function of
the criminal law, a state of affairs that is much more comfortable in a
liberal world. The entrance of religious diversity onto the criminal law
scene crystallized the hard question about the justified moral reach of
the criminal law and provoked this strident claim for the criminal law’s
role in creating a common morality of gender equality.
On the other side of the equation, the abstract ideal of moral
diversity promised by the constitutional protection of religion, is happily
embraced as a marker of any good liberal democracy. Yet, when mixed
with substantive criminal law, the constitutional protection of religion
must squarely face its own hard question: the limits of religious freedom
118
R. v. Humaid, [2006] O.J. No. 1507, 37 C.R. (6th) 347, at para. 93 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 232 (S.C.C.). For a proposal advocating the continued
use of the law of provocation, but a use calibrated to the “equality-seeking” aspect of the Charter,
see Camille A. Nelson, “(En)raged or (En)gaged: The Implications of Racial Context to the Canadian
Provocation Defence” (2002) 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1007.
119
Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004), at 296. Power concurs,
arguing that “the defence is gendered and heterosexist, and thus cultural, in so far as it privileges
paradigmatically heterosexual, male violence” (Helen Power, “Provocation and Culture” (2006)
Crim. L. Rev. 871, at 877), concluding further that, as such, “reform is ultimately doomed” (at 872). In
a similar vein, De Pasquale argues that “provocation is itself a dominant cultural defence” and has
always been an inherently “cultural” defence insofar as it is “replete with heterosexist cultural
judgments” (Santo De Pasquale, “Provocation and the Homosexual Advance Defence: The Deployment
of Culture as a Defence Strategy” (2002) 26.1 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 110, at 111).
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and equality. Despite the Court’s expansive reading of the scope of section
2(a), Dickson C.J.C.’s words in Big M begin again to echo in our ears:
Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary
to his beliefs or his conscience.120

The very context and structure of substantive criminal law forces the
issue of this “subject to”. Recall that the language of “public safety, order,
health, or morals” precisely echoes the valid purposes of the criminal
law as outlined in the Margarine Reference121 and other cases. It is also
always the case that allegations of criminality are predicated on alleged
affronts to the parallel rights and freedoms of others and violations of
the fundamental values entrenched in the Charter. Those who would
approach religion in provocation in the way that Doherty J. did in R. v.
Humaid122 are also, then, making deep claims about the legitimate scope
of the criminal law — a judgment about the nature of religious freedom
and equality and their interaction with other constitutional rights and
values that, if defensible, is far from manifest. It is as though Dickson
C.J.C.’s foundational statement about the limits of religious freedom
predicted its interaction with the morally constructive force of the
criminal law.
4. Religion and Polygamy
A second example of a recent appearance of the friction between the
moral regulation inherent in the criminal law and the moral freedom
suggested by the constitutional protection of religion is the emergence
of questions concerning the criminal prohibition of polygamy. Whereas
the example of provocation was an example of the way in which religious
difference can raise issues about the construction of substantive criminal
law concepts, the issue of polygamy revolves around the justifiability of
a law criminalizing practices that might be motivated by religious beliefs.
As such, this example is useful in drawing forward other aspects of the
possible interaction between substantive criminal law and the constitutional
120
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protection of religion, including the pivotal role that section 1 analyses
will play. The polygamy issue is also a valuable focal point, however,
because arguments in support of the criminal prohibition of polygamy
are so encrusted with the attempt, discussed above, to bury the morally
coercive nature of criminal regulation under a language of harm and
harm-reduction. Even a light excavation of the debate lays bare, however,
the fundamental moral dynamic that I have been pointing to in this paper.
The debate around the criminal prohibition of polygamous
relationships has most recently crystallized around the community of
Bountiful, British Columbia. 123 The members of this community in
southeastern British Columbia belong to the Fundamentalist Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, a group whose polygamous lifestyle
led to a fissure with the mainstream Mormon Church. For nearly 20 years,
the B.C. Crown has struggled with the question of whether members of
the community should be charged pursuant to section 293 of the Criminal
Code,124 which creates an indictable offence for anyone practising,
celebrating, assisting in, or otherwise being a party to “any form of
polygamy”.125 In 1990, a police investigation of this community resulted
in the recommendation that charges be laid under this provision. However,
on the strength of legal opinions that section 293 would be struck down
as an unconstitutional constraint on the religious liberties guaranteed
in section 2(a) of the Charter, the Crown chose not to proceed. The
community of Bountiful again came to the forefront of media and legal
attention when, in 2006 and in response to allegations that adults in
123

For a broad canvassing of various legal and social issues surrounding polygamy in Canada,
see generally Status of Women Canada, “Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social Implications for
Women and Children — A Collection of Policy Research Reports” by Angela Campbell et al.
(November 2005), online: Status of Women Canada <http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/
0662420683/200511_0662420683_e.pdf>.
124
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
125
Polygamy was first criminalized in Canada in 1890, with An Act further to amend the
Criminal Law, S.C. 1890, c. 37, s. 11, and subsequently appeared in the first Criminal Code, S.C. 1892,
c. 29, s. 278. Along with a general prohibition of “polygamy” and “any kind of conjugal union with
one or more persons at the same time”, these early provisions specifically proscribe “what among
persons commonly called Mormons is known as spiritual or plural marriage”. This express reference
to the Mormon religion, which disappeared from the Code with the comprehensive amendments in
1953-54 (Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51), was a product of “the influence of American law,
which was trying by means of the criminal law to stamp out a resurgence of the practice of polygamy
among members of the Mormon community, especially in the state of Utah” (Canada, Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Bigamy, Working Paper No. 42 (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1985), at 22.) For an engaging and thorough account of the history of polygamy in the United States,
see Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in
Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
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positions of “trust or authority” were engaging in sexual contact with
young girls in the community, the RCMP recommended that individuals
in Bountiful be charged with sexual exploitation, contrary to section 153
of the Criminal Code.
After Crown Counsel reviewed the evidence in the case and concluded
that there was not a “substantial likelihood of conviction”, the Ministry
of Attorney General appointed Mr. Richard Peck, Q.C., as a special
prosecutor, tasked with reassessing the evidence and considering all
potential criminal and quasi-criminal charges, including polygamy.126
On August 1, 2007, the Criminal Justice Branch of the Ministry of
Attorney General announced Mr. Peck’s recommendation. He agreed
with the Crown’s earlier assessment of the evidence, found that none of
a range of possible other offences were applicable, and recommended
that the Attorney General refer the issue of the constitutionality of section
293 of the Criminal Code127 to the B.C. Court of Appeal.128 In the summary
of conclusions in his report to the Attorney General, Mr. Peck expressed
the view that, given that “[r]eligious freedom in Canada is not absolute”
but, rather, “subject to reasonable limits necessary to protect ‘public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms
of others’”, there is a “good case for upholding s. 293 as compliant with
the Charter”.129
Mr. Peck is precisely correct, of course, that the issue of the
criminalization of polygamy puts us squarely into the centre of Dickson
C.J.C.’s statement in Big M130 about the limits of religious freedom. The
courts that consider this issue will first have to ask whether there is a
breach of section 2(a). Under the prevailing approach to freedom of
religion, the breach seems evident: so long as polygamy is sincerely felt
by the members of the community to be an aspect of their religious
conscience, a criminalization of this practice is more than a trivial
126
Partway through his work, Mr. Peck asked that his mandate be expanded to include
considering whether a constitutional reference, rather than criminal charges, should be pursued.
127
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
128
Following receipt of Mr. Peck’s report, Attorney General Wally Oppal asked Vancouver
lawyer Leonard Doust to again review the issue. Reporting back to the criminal justice branch of
the Ministry of Attorney General in early April 2008, Mr. Doust concurred with Mr. Peck,
concluding that a constitutional reference to the B.C. Court of Appeal — rather than a prosecution
— was the best course of action. At the time of writing, Mr. Oppal had not yet announced a
decision as to how the government would proceed.
129
Report of the Special Prosecutor for Allegations of Misconduct Associated with Bountiful,
B.C., Summary of Conclusions.
130
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).

546

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

interference and the breach of section 2(a) is, thus, made out. The result
will turn entirely on whether the courts find that this limit on religious
freedom can be demonstrably justified under section 1. Whatever the
ultimate result, the polygamy issue is manifestly about the limits of the
moral freedom suggested by section 2(a) of the Charter.
However, as I have suggested in this paper, what is less obvious in
the debate but no less true is that the issue also poses the difficult and
uncomfortable question of the limits of the criminal law. Given the
symbolic freight carried by the institution of marriage, a symbolic
dimension made so manifest in the same-sex marriage debates, the
assessment of the constitutionality of the crime of polygamy necessarily
puts us in the liberally awkward position of contemplating the use of the
most extreme force of the state to enforce a particular — and particularly
powerful — view of ethical life. Part of the criminal law since before
the first Criminal Code in 1892 and, to this day, listed alongside offences
specifically concerned with the institution of marriage and provisions
directed at abortion, libel, and hate propaganda, the criminal prohibition
of polygamy is, at first blush, a matter of morality and social value.
But as is so often the case when modern liberal society begins to
blush at apparent moral regulation, there is a vigorous flight to the
language of harm. This is particularly so in the case of Bountiful, given
that the question of polygamy was raised in the context of allegations of
sexual interference with children, a harm that the criminal law is justifiably
confident in targeting.131 Yet questions of harm to children can be —
131

For a review of some of the posited harms to children, see Nicholas Bala et al., “An
International Review of Polygamy: Legal and Policy Implications for Canada” in Polygamy in
Canada: Legal and Social Implications for Women and Children — A Collection of Policy
Research Reports by Angela Campbell et al. (November 2005), online: Status of Women Canada
<http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/0662420683/200511_0662420683-2_1_e.html>; Angela
Campbell, “How Have Policy Approaches to Polygamy Responded to Women’s Experiences and
Rights? An International, Comparative Analysis” in Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social Implications
for Women and Children — A Collection of Policy Research Reports by Angela Campbell et al.
(November 2005), online: Status of Women Canada <http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/
0662420683/200511_0662420683-1_1_e.html>. Bala et al. state, in their executive summary, that
there is evidence that
suggests that polygamy has significant negative effects on children, as children of polygamous
families are more likely to experience emotional difficulties and have lower educational
achievement than children in monogamous families. Questions have also been raised about
high levels of child abuse, neglect and exploitation in polygamous families. In Fundamentalist
Mormon communities in North America, a significant number of reports indicate that
adolescent girls and young women are being coerced, physically but more commonly
psychologically, into polygamy.
The authors also note in their concluding analysis and recommendations, however, that “there are
significant limitations to the existing social science research on polygamy in terms of methodology
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and, had there been sufficient evidence in this case, presumably would
have been — addressed with other offences in the Criminal Code132
specifically targeting this evil. Polygamy is no more inherently connected
with the abuse of children than are other forms of family organization.
To turn to a discussion of sexual harm to children is, in this sense, to
sidestep the question of polygamy itself.
Yet the section 1 analysis demands that the courts define the objective
of the criminalization of polygamy and the prevention of harm will, no
doubt, be raised as a candidate. To this end, the other form of harm that
is invoked when the issue of polygamy is raised is harm to women. This
claim can take one of two forms. The first is that women involved in
polygamous relationships suffer a degree of physical and psychological
harm that demands the criminalization of this form of family
organization.133 However, this argument has an intrinsic overbreadth,
and sample size”. Campbell raises real concerns about potential abuse to children in some polygamous
communities but concludes that “ambiguity exists within the research examining children in
polygamous families. In some scenarios, these children did not seem to be adversely affected by
their polygamous family structure. But some research also suggests that polygamy might place
children in harm’s way, for example, by isolating them socially, or by subjecting them to potentially
hateful relationships between co-wives.” For a complex picture of the impacts of polygamy on
children, see Stephanie Forbes, “‘Why Just Have One?’ An Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws
Under the Establishment Clause” (2003) 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1517, at 1544-45.
132
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
133
Nicholas Bala et al., “An International Review of Polygamy: Legal and Policy Implications
for Canada” in Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social Implications for Women and Children —
A Collection of Policy Research Reports by Angela Campbell et al. (November 2005), online: Status
of Women <http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/0662420683/200511_0662420683-2_1_e.html>, also
reviews some of the social science literature suggesting these types of harms, concluding that
“[p]olygamous relationships appear significantly more likely than monogamous relationships to be
characterized by physical and emotional abuse of women. Many women in polygamous unions
experience a diminished sense of self-worth and suffer from competition with the other wives.”
Angela Campbell, “How Have Policy Approaches to Polygamy Responded to Women’s Experiences
and Rights? An International, Comparative Analysis” in Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social
Implications for Women and Children — A Collection of Policy Research Reports by Angela
Campbell et al. (November 2005), online: Status of Women <http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/
0662420683/200511_0662420683-1_1_e.html> draws a more cautious lesson from the research,
stating in her conclusion on women’s experiences in polygamy that
it is difficult to draw a single, clear conclusion as to whether life in a polygamous marriage
is harmful to women. Whether women suffer or benefit from plural marriage actually seems
to be the improper query through which to investigate the consequences of polygamy for women,
since it is far too general. It implies that women in polygamy shar e uniform realities,
regardless of the communities and cultures in which they live, and regardless of the particular
relationships formed within their families.
For other scholarly articles (also cited in Campbell’s report) that present a complex picture of the
effects of polygamy on women, see David L. Chambers, “Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage”
(1997) 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 53, at 73-74 and Stephanie Forbes, “‘Why Just Have One?’ An Evaluation of
the Anti-Polygamy Laws Under the Establishment Clause” (2003) 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1517, at 1542-43.
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criminalizing possible loving, non-abusive polygamous marriages. To be
sure, the question of the incidence of physical harms to women involved
in polygamous relationships is a matter of the utmost concern for the
criminal law. But, again, with sufficient evidence these types of harms can
be addressed with prosecutions for more specifically tailored offences. It
should be borne in mind that there is a long history and ample
contemporary evidence of appalling rates of violence against women in
the context of monogamous marriage, yet it is this abhorrent conduct, not
this form of marriage, that has become the subject of the criminal law’s
attention.
The second form of harm to women that can be argued is a symbolic
or communicative one and this form of harm, by contrast, maintains a
requisite specificity around polygamy.134 This argument is that, in their
very numerical and structural inequality, polygamous relationships that
involve multiple wives send the message that women are less worthy of
respect and concern, which, in turn, results in an attitudinal harm that
damages gender equality at a broad social level.135 This is something of a
familiar argument, found as it is in the jurisprudence surrounding indecency
and obscenity. The equally familiar reply is to object that such an assertion
denies that women in such relationships have full liberty or are able to
make genuine choices.136 As I alluded to when discussing the internal
contestability of Charter values, arguments about the need to protect the
broad value of equality can nearly always be met with some form of
134
Although there are certainly those who would argue that monogamous marriage is
indelibly patriarchal and, as such, sends a similarly negative message about the status of women.
135
See, e.g., Beverley Baines, “Equality’s Nemesis?” (2006) 5 J.L. & Equality 57; Lisa M.
Kelly, “Bringing International Human Rights Law Home: An Evaluation of Canada’s Family Law
Treatment of Polygamy” (2007) 65 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1, at 12 (“While the economic, health and
child-related harms of polygyny are important factors to consider, this article’s argument for the
non-recognition of polygyny stems from the gender discriminatory and patriarchal nature of the
practice.”). Nicholas Bala et al., “An International Review of Polygamy: Legal and Policy
Implications for Canada” in Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social Implications for Women and
Children — A Collection of Policy Research Reports by Angela Campbell et al. (November 2005),
online: Status of Women <http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/0662420683/200511_06624206832_1_e.html> also make this argument, stating in their executive summary that “[t]he practice of
polygamy is . . . contrary to notions of gender equality that are fundamental to Canadian society”.
136
See, e.g., Michele Alexandre, “Big Love: Is Feminist Polygamy an Oxymoron or a True
Possibility?” (2007) 18 Hastings Womens L.J. 3, at 5, in which the author “invokes the concept of
cultural feminism to advocate for both the acceptance of women’s choices and the protection of
Muslim women who choose to live in polygamy”. For the author, “what matters . . . is the fact that
women who choose polygamy, like those who make any other legitimate choice, must be protected”
(at 4). Part of Alexandre’s argument is a call to ensure that Muslim practices of polygamy reflect a
“women-centric” (at 6) approach whereby “women’s desires and wishes serve as a foundation for
any system of polygamy” (at 6).
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objection that appeals to the value of liberty. The point is not to deny the
need to concern ourselves with communicative harms but, rather, that once
abstracted to the level of harm to values, the debate becomes overtly and
porously normative.
With a return to normative judgment, we are left in much the same
structural position as would have been the case had we taken the
criminalization of polygamy for what it appears to be: a use of the
criminal law to protect a cultural commitment to monogamous marriage,
a commitment itself still deeply influenced by the norms of a particular
Christian cultural milieu out of which, after all, section 293 itself
historically emerged.137 Although one formulation of the issue is packaged
in modern liberal terms, the issue remains whether or not it is legitimate
to use the criminal law to enforce a particular normative vision and, in
so doing, to limit the freedom to pursue a way of life predicated on a
different moral outlook. Are we really so far from Dickson C.J.C.’s
central concern in Big M — that this provision “takes religious values
rooted in Christian morality and, using the force of the state, translates
them into a positive law binding on believers and non-believers alike”138
— or is it simply that a larger group of Canadians are less willing to
compromise their symbolic and normative commitment to monogamous
marriage than they are comfortable with stores being open on Sundays?
That there are dimensions of meaningful difference between these two
cases is certain. Yet whatever else is also going on, there is a robust
dimension of moral coercion at play in the criminalization of polygamy,
a kind of coercion that abrades the protection of a meaningful margin of
moral appreciation implied in the constitutional protection of religious
freedom and equality. However the question of the criminal prohibition
of polygamy is resolved, the answer will be a response to this underlying
tension.
To be sure, both the prevailing way of talking about the criminal
law and the force of constitutional analysis will seek to launder the issue
of this underlying moral tension; issues of social value will be cast as
questions of harm and minimal impairment. But the conjunction of crime,
137

See note 125, above. See also Robert Leckey, “Profane Matrimony” (2006) 21:2 C.J.L.S. 1.
In a rich and compelling analysis that demonstrates the ways in which civil marriage and religious
marriage have been and continue to be involved in a complex and mutually defining relationship,
Leckey shows the untenability of the commonly made contemporary claim (made, in fact, by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
698 (S.C.C.)) that civil and religious marriage are entirely distinct institutions.
138
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.).
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sex, family and religion inherent in this issue makes this fundamental
dynamic between moral judgment and moral freedom an unavoidable
feature of public debate on this question, whether overtly identified or not.
In this way, what makes polygamy such a provocative issue is that it
exposes both the stubbornly moral inflection of our criminal law and
certain limits on our tolerance for deep religious difference, two aspects
of the culture of the Canadian rule of law that are so obviously salient
but with which we are far from comfortable.

IV. CONCLUSION: FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW
In this paper I have sought to draw out something of a hidden
relationship between the constitutional protection of religion and the
substantive criminal law. I have endeavoured to demonstrate that, although
comparatively little jurisprudential and scholarly attention has been devoted
to this topic, there is, in fact, an interesting story to be told about the
interaction of substantive criminal law and the constitutional protection
of religion since the introduction of the Charter. In beginning to tell this
story, I have pointed to three formal ways in which substantive criminal
law has interacted with religious freedom and equality over the past 25
years: a select number of cases have overtly tested substantive criminal
laws against section 2(a) of the Charter; in certain instances substantive
criminal law has been used in aid of the protection of religious freedom
and equality; and in other, more subtle ways, the guarantee of religious
freedom and equality has been a resource for the interpretation of
substantive criminal law concepts.
But more than simply narrating this story, I have been concerned
with drawing out a simple but rich subtending dynamic between criminal
law and religion in the Charter era. The constitutional protection of
religion is, at its core, an offer of a certain moral freedom, whereas
criminal law is irreducibly about moral regulation. In this respect, these
two aspects of our legal culture reflect powerfully competing ethics in
the modern liberal constitutional state. On the one hand, we are strongly
dedicated to the idea that the state should remain agnostic on the kinds
of basic value judgments made by individuals and groups in society. On
the other hand, the criminal law is a forceful expression of some of the
most essential moral judgments of dominant Canadian society. There is,
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thus, a deeply provocative tension in this relationship between the
constitutional protection of religion and substantive criminal law.
This tension has lain largely unseen for much of the past 25 years.
Part of the explanation for the hiddenness of this dynamic has been our
devotion to two other stories that palliate the tension that I have tried to
expose. In the Charter era, substantive criminal law has been increasingly
talked about in the morally stripped language of harm. The story here is
that, although no doubt at one time a vehicle of moral coercion, the
criminal law has been unmoored from bare questions of value. The story
about religious freedom and equality builds from this general way of
thinking about state law and holds that, with only the most extreme and
complex exceptions, under the Charter we have developed a relatively
robust tolerance for the kind of lifestyle and value differences inherent
in religious diversity. This is the story of legal multiculturalism and
religious accommodation that is predicated on a sense of law as highly
malleable and largely instrumental. In the result, we have two comforting
stories that veil what I am pointing to as our agonal commitments to law
— perhaps most particularly constitutional and criminal law — as an
agent of moral freedom and of moral constraint.
In recent years, however, cracks have been starting to appear in both
of these stories, disturbing our comfort. I have pointed to two recent
instances in which religious difference has clashed with substantive
criminal law in a way that pushes this underlying moral dynamic to the
forefront. When faced with issues like the role of religious difference in
approaching the defence of provocation and the constitutionality of the
polygamy offence, the friction between the moral force of the criminal
law and the guarantee of moral liberty that inheres in section 2(a) produces
a heat that cannot be ignored. And, despite the resulting discomfort, this
is, to my eye, a good thing. These points of friction reveal much about
both aspects of our legal culture and, thereby, encourage us to reason
more honestly and more complexly about both the nature of the criminal
law and the limits on religious freedom and equality, both of which are
keenly felt, even if not spoken about.
The tension that I have identified reflects a deep liberal ambivalence
about the role of value in the law; indeed, it is an ambivalence reflected
in the Charter itself, a document of great moral ambition but one that
also reflects a concern for moral modesty. With increased religious
diversity likely to raise this tension more frequently before the courts,
what should be done? What jurisprudential posture should be taken? In
truth, there is no legal “fix” to the dynamic I have identified; this is not a
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tension that judges can dissipate with just the right judgment in a given
case or a novel jurisprudential approach. But there is, nevertheless, a
practical call implicit in my discussion. It is the call for transparency in
what may be at stake in the meeting between religion and criminal law,
and modesty in the use of the force of law. There is little basis to suspect
that speaking in an uncritical language of harm and tolerance reduces
moral conflict. On the other hand, there is ample basis to conclude that
thus veiling the conflict prevents meaningful debate on the issues truly
at stake. What we need in our jurisprudence is for judges to identify and
speak to the importance of the values being pursued in the criminal law,
to — where possible — stay criminal law’s violent hand in the imposition
of these judgments and, in their reasons, to lay bare the broader social
debate that must be had.

